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appears on all copies.1 Thailand’s economic boom and agricultural bust
In the middle and late 1980s, a remarkable combination of domestic and international phenomena
came together to “make a miracle” in Thailand: an acceleration of real economic growth from about
6% per year in 1976-85 to above 8% in 1986-95.  At its peak in 1988-90, growth averaged 12%
per year.  Low wages, reductions in trade barriers, and conservative economic management
resulting in low inflation and a stable exchange rate made the Thai economy an ideal host for a
foreign investment.  And from late in the decade financial liberalization (The opening of the capital
account) facilitated a flow of foreign-currency denominated borrowing that by the mid-90s had
become a torrent.  This fueled an investment boom that by the early 1990s had spilled over from
tradables sectors into demand for non-traded assets, particularly stocks and real estate.  The boom
drove up non-traded goods’ prices, sometimes in spectacular fashion.  The Bangkok skyline
became a forest of cranes as property developers competed to construct ever-taller and more
prestigious office blocks and apartment towers.  Construction sector employment grew from an
average of 6% of non-agricultural labor in 1980-89 to over 10% in 1990-95.
In spite of sharply rising inequality, there could be few complaints that the gains from this
growth were not widely shared.  With employment demand outpacing labor force growth, real
wages rose dramatically from 1989, and as a result, overall poverty incidence declined.
1   Political
instability notwithstanding, and despite doubts about the robustness of its financial institutions,
Thailand had become a model developing economy, winning a place in the group of eight “high-
performing Asian economies” that the World Bank in 1993 dubbed The East Asian Miracle.
The gains from the boom were not uniformly shared among sectors, however.
Agriculture, historically the mainstay of the Thai economy, the primary employer and major source
of export earnings, captured only a tiny fragment of the investment boom, and as the most labor-
intensive set of industries, found itself increasingly unable to compete with wages offered in other
sectors.  After 1989, as close to three million workers out of a total agricultural labor force of about
20 million walked off the land, planted area began to decline and agricultural output growth rates2
decelerated (Table 1).  The relative decline of agriculture, an inevitable and generally welcome
trend in a growing economy, threatened for a time to become an absolute contraction.
In an open economy, the relative decline of agriculture is an inevitable feature of economic
growth and is not in itself a cause for concern.  However, if the decline is caused by growth that is
unsustainable, and if it involves transactions costs or irreversibilities, then aggregate welfare as
well as that of the rural poor may be reduced, and policy interventions may be merited.  In this
paper we use quantitative methods to examine aggregate and sectoral inducements to labor and land
use changes in Thai agriculture.  We then use a variant of the Dutch Disease model to examine the
likely impacts of an abrupt cut in non-agricultural labor demand, such as occurred in late 1997.
2 The fate of agriculture
As is well known, economic growth reduces the relative profitability of agriculture through several
mechanisms.  Of these, the most important are domestic terms of trade changes (Stolper-
Samuelson effects), and unequal rates of factor endowment growth, which cause factors to migrate
to sectors where their relative productivity is higher (Rybczinski effects).  Both of these
intersectoral effects are important features of explanations for the relative decline of Thai agriculture
over the period 1960-85 (Ammar 1996; Martin and Warr 1994).  Rising prices for non-traded
goods (produced mainly in non-agricultural sectors) and growth of non-agricultural capital have
apparently been the main engines of structural change in the Thai economy.  Both rising prices and
non-agricultural investment increase labor productivity outside the farm sector.  Wage pressures
and declining relative agricultural prices squeeze farm profits and discourage investment, and this
reduces the agricultural growth rate relative to rates in the rest of the economy.
The intersectoral source of agriculture’s decline in recent years can be seen with the aid of a
simple model and econometric analysis.  We begin by asking what factors explain agricultural
factor demand at the level of the sector.  The conventional approach is to model the sector as a
price-taking firm and to derive optimal output and factor demands in terms of exogenous prices,
fixed factor endowments, and technology.  However, Thai agriculture cannot be said to be a price-
taker in the labor market.  While the total agricultural labor force is by no means fixed even in the3
short run, the agricultural wage is endogenous to agricultural labor demand.  Therefore, we must
simultaneously explain agricultural wage formation.  The dividend from doing so is that we are
able to gauge the determinants of Thai agricultural factor demand in an economy-wide setting.  In
particular, since land and labor are complementary inputs, we expect to find that some part of the
explanation for the observed area decline is to be found in intersectoral labor market trends.
Our model explains agricultural land and labor demand in terms of product prices, prices of
other variable inputs, fixed input quantities, and technical progress, and wages are explained by
reference to the intersectoral labor market, as follows.
Labor demand.  Agricultural labor demand is determined by the agricultural wage (WA)
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and the price of fertilizer (PF), both expressed in terms of agricultural prices (PA); the quantities of
non-labor factors including land (NA), irrigation (IR) and agricultural machinery (KA); and a












where superscripts indicate the signs of the partial derivatives as predicted by theory.
   Land demand.  While the total land endowment may be regarded as fixed in the short run,
planted area may fluctuate from year to year.  In our model the demand for land, measured as the
area planted in each period, is determined by agricultural prices, a measure of labor availability or
wages, the price of fertilizer, the quantities of other inputs (irrigation, labor, agricultural
machinery), and technology.  Whether the quantity of agricultural labor or the wage should appear
in this equation depends on our assumption about labor mobility.  If labor were intersectorally
immobile (or at least of very limited mobility) then it would be appropriate to use the quantity of
agricultural labor as a measure of a fixed factor endowment.  Alternatively, if labor were mobile so
that farmers, having made land use and technology decisions, could readily hire the required labor,
then the wage would a more appropriate explanatory variable.  Neither specification is likely to be
strictly correct in a short-medium run analysis of Thai agriculture, and we lack sufficient
information to test them empirically.  Accordingly, we fit both models and compare their results.
The alternative explanations for land demand are shown as (2a) and (2b):4























Equations (1) and either (2a) or (2b) are interdependent since endogenous variables appear on their
right hand sides.  There are two additional complications.  First, some or all equations may be
underidentified, depending on the exact combination of exogenous variables included and excluded
from each.  Second, due to the large share of agriculture in total employment, the agricultural wage
is also not invariant with respect to changes in agriculture, another source of simultaneity bias.  We
resolve these problems, and capture economic links between agricultural and non-agricultural
development, by explaining the agricultural wage by reference to intersectoral labor market.
Agricultural wages.  The Thai labor market exhibits a high degree of intersectoral mobility
at the margin, and the agricultural wage has tracked the non-agricultural wage fairly closely over
time.  We expect that agricultural wages (WA) and non-agricultural wages (WN) are related, but
that the correspondence is not exact due to transactions costs and adjustment lags, i.e. WA =
WA(WA-1, WN).  We then explain WN by constructing an inverse non-agricultural labor demand
function in terms of non-agricultural prices (PN), the aggregate capital stock (KN), labor supply








If a linear combination of these variables is correlated with the non-agricultural wage, then we can
explain the agricultural wage by (3):









in which the current value of WA depends on contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous
variables determining the non-agricultural wage.
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The simultaneous solution of (1), (2a) or (2b) and (3) resolves the identification problem,
and captures the main intersectoral linkages through product and labor markets. By substitution
from (3) into (1) and (2) it can readily be seen that the reduced form of the system is a pair of5
agricultural factor demand equations in which the explanatory variables are prices (PA, PN), fixed
factor stocks (KA, KN, IR), and technological progress (T).
Data, estimation and results
We use a time series of Thai regional data that spans 35 years (1961-95) and four regions as well
as the Bangkok metropolitan area (for full details see Coxhead with Jiraporn 1998).  For estimation
we select some specific categorical variables for inclusion in each of the factor demand equations.
In addition to the variables shown in (1)-(3) we add regional dummy variables and a set of
categorical variables (FT, IN) accounting for the combination of crops with different characteristics
into aggregate agricultural output and factor demand.  Defining all continuous variables except the
time trend in logarithms (denoted by a prime, e.g. LA¢ = ln(LA)), the system to be estimated,
excluding regional dummies, is:
 (4) LA¢ = a1 + b1(WA¢–PA¢)+ c1(PF¢–PA¢)+ d1NA¢ + e1IR¢ + f1KA¢ + g1FT¢ + h1T + e1 ,
 (5a) NA¢ = a2 + b2PA¢ + c2(PF¢–PA¢)+ d2(WA¢–PA¢) + e2IR¢ + f2KA¢ + g2IN¢ + h2T + e2 ,
or
(5b) NA¢  = a2 + b2PA¢+ c2(PF¢–PA¢)+ i2LA¢ + e2IR¢ + f2KA¢ + g2IN¢ + h2T + e2 ,
 (6) WA¢  = a3 + b3PN¢+ c3KN¢+ d3LF¢ + e3WA¢-1 + h3T  + e3 .
We use 3SLS to fit systems consisting first of (4), (5a),(6), then of (4), (5b), (6) (White 1993).
Most of the estimates are highly significant and of the predicted sign.  Since the two sets of results
are very similar, we report only those for the former system in Table 2.
Labor demand.  As expected, labor demand is positively associated with land area, and
negatively with the agricultural wage and the stock of agricultural machinery.  Contrary to
expectations, an increase in the fertilizer price contributes to increased labor demand.  This may be
due to high correlation between fertilizer use and irrigation, since most fertilizer is used in irrigated
rice production.  Alternatively, a fertilizer price increase may result in reallocation of resources to
more labor-intensive, less fertilizer-using crops, a shift masked by our use of an aggregate output6
measure.  The coefficient of the time trend suggests that over the entire period, technical progress
in agriculture has been labor-using at a rate of approximately 3% per year.
Land demand.  The estimated parameters of the land demand function conformed entirely
with expectations, and all are significant at conventional levels.  Higher agricultural prices are
associated with increased land demand, as are increases in the quantities of complementary inputs
(agricultural capital) and the price of a substitute (fertilizer).  Higher agricultural wages reduce land
demand.  An increase in irrigated area represents a positive land supply “shock” that causes planted
area to expand, but by less than a proportional amount—indicating that as irrigated area expands,
demand for non-irrigated land contracts. Technical progress in agriculture has been land-saving
over the period covered by the data, at a rate of about 1% per year.
Agricultural wages.   All estimates of (6) were of the predicted sign.  Surprisingly, the
dynamic component of the model had no impact, with the estimated coefficient of WA-1 being just
smaller than its standard error and very small in magnitude.  By contrast, the contemporaneous
determinants of non-agricultural wages, PN, KN and LF, were all found to exert strong effects on
WA.  The coefficient of non-agricultural productivity growth was not significant.
Table 3 shows elasticities of the reduced form equations.  In the shorter-run estimates it is
assumed that agricultural land use decisions are made on the basis of a fixed amount of labor.  In
the longer-run estimates, labor is assumed to be mobile. The results confirm that in spite of
significant agricultural investments, for example irrigation, the evolution of agricultural factor
demand is largely driven by non-agricultural phenomena, specifically non-agricultural prices and
investment.  These raise agricultural wages and this in turn drives agricultural resource allocation
decisions.  The estimates help quantify the Rybczinski effect of non-agricultural growth.
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The econometric result provides strongly intuitive explanations both for the decline of
agricultural land area, and for some of the reasons behind the rapid mechanization of Thai
agriculture since 1989.  With massive outflow of labor, a considerable amount of agricultural land
was idled.  It is also of interest to note from that in the shorter run, labor and machinery are clear7
substitutes.  Mechanization diminishes employment opportunities in agriculture, a point with
significant implications in the current economic crisis.
3 Was growth in the 1990s “too fast”?
As we have just seen, the economic boom of 1988-95 was associated with the reversal of long-
term growth rates of employment and land area in Thai agriculture.  Agriculture’s sudden decline
may also be a source of policy concern if it has occurred at a rate greater than warranted by long-
term trends in factor endowment and productivity growth rates, and if the economy is characterized
by significant market or technological irreversibilities.
Where does the problem arise?  In the standard “Dutch disease” (DD) model, the long-term
decline of a tradable sector occurs in response to a permanent change in relative prices or rates of
factor accumulation, technical progress, or changing consumer preferences (Corden and Neary
1982).  In such cases the decline (e.g. of agriculture) is socially optimal, and any intervention
directed at slowing or reversing the sector’s decline would reduce welfare.  The Thai case,
however, violates key assumptions of this result.  The fuel for the boom was the accumulation of
capital which, in contrast to the standard DD model, was internationally mobile after 1990.
Therefore, resources upon which the boom was built could relatively easily be withdrawn from the
economy, with consequent reductions in non-agricultural production and labor demand.  The fact
that much of this investment was financed by borrowing in short-term international money markets
is of course relevant, since it means that the end of the boom, when it came, was marked by very
rapid capital outflow.  It is also significant that much of the boom occurred in labor-intensive non-
tradable sectors such as property development and construction, where asset prices were driven to
unjustifiable heights in a fashion characteristic of a “bubble” economy.
Seen this way, the investment boom of the 1990s was analogous to a temporary resource
boom of the kind experienced by most oil-exporting countries in the 1970s.  As those countries
discovered, treating a boom as permanent when it is in fact temporary can be costly in terms of
long-run growth.  The same may now be true of Thailand.  First, the decline in agriculture’s8
domestic terms of trade with other sectors—caused by the investment boom and by spending on
non-traded, non-agricultural goods and services—was probably exaggerated.  Second, too-rapid
growth in non-agricultural labor demand may have stimulated a faster rate of non-agricultural wage
growth than long-term factor market trends would warrant.  This in turn provided incentives for
migration, and thus for a contraction of planted area as well as for agricultural mechanization.
Even so, the boom poses a long-term problem only if it has long-term effects.  Although
the data for a formal test are not yet available, we contend below that the boom may have
stimulated a pattern of agricultural and labor market responses which will be costly to correct in the
long run.  Transactions costs associated with labor migration, and sunk costs of agricultural
mechanization suggest that the investment boom may have induced some changes in labor markets
and agricultural technology that will be difficult to reverse in the very different economic climate of
the late 1990s. Some resources will have to be expended to correct them, leading to a welfare loss.
In this sense Thai growth in 1988-95 may have been “too fast”, and corrective policies to inhibit it,
and thus to prevent such a rapid agricultural decline, were merited.
The Thai wage boom and the crash of 1997 threw tens of thousands of unskilled or semi-
skilled workers out of work, in construction as well as in traditional labor-intensive manufacturing
sectors.  In late 1997, the Thai press reported huge increases in open unemployment and predicted
widespread migration ‘back to the farm’.  A question that immediately arises is whether such a
movement would actually occur, and if so, with what consequences.  Although the rapid transfer
of labor out of agriculture in the past indicates a high degree of mobility, this may be much greater
away from the farm than back again.  The Harris-Todaro migration model predicts that with urban
wages higher than those in rural (i.e. agricultural) occupations, but with the probability of urban
unemployment being less than one, there will always be a pool of unemployed urban workers for
whom the prospect of a high-paying job in the future is still more attractive than returning to the
farm to receive a low, but certain, wage (Harris and Todaro 1970).  Their decisions can be
reinterpreted in terms of irreversible investments.  By deciding to leave the farm, migrant workers
have exercised an option —in this case, the option of staying home and earning a low but certain9
wage, and invested in the rural-urban move and associated costs.  Having done so they are
unlikely to give up their new situation readily, especially if they continue to believe that a recovery
is imminent and that they should therefore remain “in line” in the urban job market.
A second reason may have to do with the nature and rate of agricultural and non-
agricultural investment in recent years.  Agricultural mechanization grew exponentially during the
period of very rapid intersectoral labor transfer, and as we have seen, labor and machinery are
short-run substitutes.  Therefore, even if labor were to return to the farm, sunk costs of
mechanization may mean that creation of new farm jobs occurs only with a lag of a year or more.
The key aspects of the problem can be captured in stylized form with a simple geometric
model of the labor market (Diagram 1).  The width of the diagram measures total labor supply at
any point in time.  If agricultural labor demand is measured from the right and non-agricultural
demand from the left, and if non-agricultural wages are fixed by some criterion other than equality
of marginal product with the wage, the diagram shows how labor will move between sectors in
response to fluctuations in non-agricultural demand.  Workers face a choice between accepting
rural (farm) work with an assured wage (wA) and migrating in search of urban (non-agricultural)
work at a higher wage (wN), but with a probability r<1 of actually finding employment.  In this
model there is always positive unemployment in the urban labor market as workers seek higher-
paying jobs.  Labor market equilibrium is given by the condition  wA = rwN, where r is non-
agricultural employment as a fraction of the supply of labor to non- agricultural sectors.  In
Diagram 1, for given values of WN and LN, this condition is satisfied only by points along the
rectangular hyperbola hh, the so-called “Harris-Todaro curve” (Corden and Findlay 1975).  In this
way the agricultural wage is seen to depend on non-agricultural wages and employment— as was
confirmed in the econometric analysis.
Diagram 1 captures the essential features of our argument about adjustment and migration
in the wake of Thailand’s investment boom and collapse.  First, since r<1 it is always preferable
to some workers to be unemployed in the urban labor force than to return to the land.  For a given10
(negative) non-agricultural unemployment shock, urban unemployment may rise or fall, depending
on the elasticity of the agricultural labor demand curve in the relevant region.  The same condition
will determine the amount by which the shock reduces agricultural wages.  Suppose that curve DA
represents the pre-mechanization labor demand curve, and that mechanization means that
agricultural labor demand becomes less responsive to wages as illustrated by curve DA’.  Then a
recession resulting in reduced non-agricultural employment will cause fewer workers to return to
the land when agriculture is mechanized than when it is not.  In the diagram, initial agricultural
labor demand is 0ALA.  Suppose non-agricultural labor demand contracts (from LN to LN’).  In non-
mechanized agriculture there is a substantial back-flow to rural areas, accompanied by a slight fall
in agricultural wages.  Urban unemployment contracts from LNLA to LN’LA’.  In mechanized
agriculture, by contrast, there is little migration, resulting in a higher unemployment level of
LN’LA’’, and a larger agricultural wage decline.
We have shown that the Thai economic boom of the 1990s caused the rate of agricultural
decline to accelerate, primarily through labor market mechanisms.  Rapid mechanization was one
response to rising wages; declining land area planted to crops was another.  In 1998, however,
with the bubble burst and the Thai economy facing significant open unemployment for the first
time in its modern history, it appears that with hindsight, policies to slow the rate of economic
growth, and by extension the pace of structural change, were merited.
We have argued that whether a recession in non-agricultural sectors will lead to out-
migration and a boom in agricultural employment will depend on labor market structure and on the
elasticity of agricultural labor demand.  Irreversibilities associated with migration and
mechanization might inhibit the economy’s return to something like its pre-bubble structure.
Naturally, we still lack the data required to gauge the actual effect of the recession on wages,
employment and production.  Nevertheless, it seems safe to conclude that a more sustainable
economic development strategy in such an open economy would have included some sterilization
of the initial investment boom, in other words, a trade-off of short-run growth for longer-run
stability.11
Table 1: Aggregate and agricultural output growth rates, Thailand (per cent per year)
Period GDP Agriculture Difference
Agr gr. as % of
GDP gr.
1965-80 7.2 4.6 2.6 64
1980-90 7.6 4.0 3.6 53
1990-94 8.2 3.1 5.1 38
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, various years.
Table 2:  3SLS estimates of labor and land demand and agric. wages (eq. (4), (5a), (6)).
Variable Abbreviation
Labor demand (LA) Land demand (NA) Agricultural wage
(WA)













 – lagged WAt-1 — — 0.00007
(0.00008)






















































N / d.f. 140 / 127 140 / 129 140 / 131
Adj. R
2 0.9624 0.9697 0.9511
Notes:
1.  Std errors in parentheses.  Superscripts a, b, and c  denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
2.  All variables except time trend are measured in logs.  For units and other descriptors see text and Table A-3.
3.  R
2 is indicative only (not bounded in [0,1]).  Regional dummy variable estimates excluded from this table.
Source of basic data : TDRI.12
Table 3: Estimated elasticities of agricultural labor and land demand
Model 1: Longer-run
(eq. (4), (5a), (6))
Model 2: Shorter run
(eq. (4), (5b), (6))
Elasticity of:
With respect to:
Labor demand Land demand Labor demand Land demand
Land use 0.82 — 0.82 —
Labor use — — — 0.53
Agricultural wage –0.62 –0.16 –0.39 —
Agricultural prices 0.44 0.17 0.29 0.01
Non-agricultural prices –0.79 –0.20 –0.53 –0.28
Fertilizer price 0.28 0.12 0.11 0.11
Irrigated area 0.15 –0.04 0.18 –0.09
Agricultural machinery 0.01 0.21 –0.18 0.20
Non-agricultural investment –0.26 –0.07 –0.14 –0.08
Labor supply 1.14 0.29 0.57 0.30
Time trend 0.01 –0.01 0.03 –0.02
Source:  3SLS estimates reported in Coxhead and Jiraporn (1998).
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Diagram 1:            Migration and wage effects of a recession in the Harris-          Todaro model13
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Endnotes
                                                
1  During Thailand’s rapid growth, poverty in Thailand has declined, with the possible
exception of a period from 1982-86, to levels which can only be regarded as trivially low  (Ammar
1996; Warr and Bhanupong 1996).  On the other hand, income distribution has worsened.  The
ratio of wealthiest to poorest quintile shares rose from 8.9 in 1975-6 to 14.0 in 1990.  The Gini
ratio, another univariate measure of income distribution, has risen relentlessly, in 1990 reaching a
level usually associated only with Latin American economies (Medhi 1994).
2  Unsubscripted variables are current values.  Only lagged values are subscripted e.g. WA-1.
3  A more complete model of the labor market would include the possible effects of wages on
the supply of labor through changes in the labor force participation rate.
4  The agricultural labor demand elasticity with respect to an increase in non-agricultural
capital stock is –0.26.  The labor data are measured in millions of workers and the capital stock in
baht*10
12, so the elasticity value can be interpreted as follows: other things equal, one agricultural
worker migrates to non-agriculture for every 4,000,000 baht invested (US $160,000 at the pre-
1997 exchange rate of baht 25:$1). The elasticity of agricultural land area with respect to non-14
                                                                                                                                                            
agricultural investment is about –0.07; by an analogous calculation, every one million baht invested
outside agriculture reduces planted area by about 1 rai (0.16 ha).  Comparing these numbers with
the average agricultural labor-land ratio (approximately 0.16, i.e., one worker per 6 rai), at
constant prices, non-agricultural investment growth causes factors to be withdrawn from
agriculture at a rate of 4 workers per rai.